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1. Introduction 
'Anything goes. Nothing works.' This statement is true in quite a number of 
cases. Can it also be applied when it comes to the mechanisms and principles 
of police and judicial cooperation within the EU? 
Official EU documents, including the papers from the High-Level Advisory 
Group on the Future of European Horne Aff airs Policy, perhaps admit the first 
part of the phrase, but would certainly refute the second.1 However, the 'medley 
of collaborations' and difficulties in implementing the numerous instruments 
have been the subject of criticism for some time. 2 In order to find an answer to 
this question one should consider the following points. 
First, one has to examine whether it is true that 'anything goes' in police 
coopetation and judicial cooperation 'between the EU Member States'. In doing 
so, one has to look at the results, or rather f acts of police and judicial cooperation 
in the EU today. 
1 High-Level Advisory Group on the Future of European Horne Affairs Policy, Proposed 
Solutions for the Future EU Justice Programme of June 2008 (Brussels 2008). 
2 See M. Anderson and J. Apap ( eds ), Striking a Balance between Freedom, Security and Justice 
in an Enlarged European Union (Brussels 2002), p. l; see e.g. C. Fijnaut, 'Transnational 
Organized Crime and Institutional Reform in the European Union', in P. Williams and D. 
Vlassis (eds), Combating Transnational Crime. Concepts, Activities and Responses (London 
2001), pp. 287-289; S. Gless, 'Introduction vor Hauptteil III', in W. Schomburg, 0. 
Lagodny, S. Gless and T. Haclmer, Internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen, 4th edn (Munich 
2006), no. 97; M. Daman, 'Cross-BorderHotPursuitin theEU',EuropeanJournalof Crime, 
CriminalLaw and CriminalJustice (2008), pp. 204-206. 
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Secondly, one has to assess whether it is true that nothing works. In doing 
so, the problems of police and judicial cooperation from a lawyer' s point of view 
will be the main focus. 
Following this analysis, possible solutions to these problems will be presented, 
which also outline the prospects for police and judicial cooperation in the future. 
Special emphasis will be placed on the options of the Llsbon Treaty and the question 
of whether the treaty may help mal<:e cooperation work better. This discussion 
also includes a closer look at the working mechanism of such cooperation. 
Finally some principles, eff ectively or with the intention of governing police 
and judicial cooperation between EU Member States, are put up for discussion, 
including also the question - resulting from the Pupino judgement-of whether 
the recently established duty of loyal cooperation may eventually herald a new 
era of sharing and shaping responsibilities in the fight against cross-border 
crime in the European Union; also in the light of a solidarity, which might even 
eventually enable the Union to build sovereignty in cross-border law enforcement. 
2. Definitions 
The question whether anything goes with regard to police and judicial coopera-
tion between EU Member States leads to the question: what is police and judicial 
cooperation all about in the first place? Lawyers from civil law jurisdictions 
. usually start with definitions to answer to such questions: 
2 .1. Police and Judicial Cooperation 
Interestingly enough, the treaties of the European Union do not define police 
and/ or judicial cooperation as such. The Lisbon Treaty, in its Art. 8 7, outlines 
a description of police collaboration only very roughly: 
'The Union shall establish police cooperation involving all the Member 
States' competent authorities, including police, customs and other spe-
cialised law enforcement services in relation to the prevention, detection 
and investigation of criminal offences.' 
Furthermore, it provides for European legislation with regard to cross-border 
law enforcement in Art. 8 9: 
26 
'The Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure, 
shall lay down the conditions and limitations under which the competent 
authorities of the Member States referred to in Articles 82 and 8 7 
may operate in the territory of another Member State in liaison and 
in agreement with the authorities of that State. The Council shall act 
unanimously after consulting the European Parliament.' 
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Whlle outlining Europol' s mission in Art. 8 8, with regard to judicial cooperation, 
the Llsbon Treaty merely states in Art. 82: 
'Judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the Union shall be based on 
the principle of mutual recognition of judgements and judicial decisions 
... and shall include the approximation of the laws and regulations of the 
Member States in the areas referred to in paragraph 2 and inArticle 83.' 
But to evaluate the results of police and judicial cooperation, as we want to do 
here, we need to clarify these terms first. Searching for a definition, for example 
in official documents, research papers or academic publications, or even in 
Wikipedia, one realises that different criteria and approaches are necessary in 
order to sum up today's police and judicial cooperation in the EU.3 Basically, 
three criteria are necessary, they illustrate what is going on and thus present 
the 'results' of this kind of cooperation: 
1) the inter-State element; 
2) the degree of the organisation of a (formal) framework or even institution 
building; and 
3) the dependence upon European law (in a broad sense). 
2.2. Cooperation 'Between the Member States' and Cooperation in the 
European Union 
Examining judicial and police cooperation in the EU framework - even at first 
sight- one finds many different layers that need tobe sorted. 4 There is - tradition-
ally, and predating the EU itself - cooperation between the EU Member States. 5 
Today, however, there is further specific cooperation within the European Union 
as well as special cooperation between EU Member States and formally associated 
States (i.e., in an institutionalised framework). 
3 M. den Boer, 'Towards an Accountability Regime for an Ernerging European Policing 
Governance', PolicingandSociety (2002), pp. 2 75-289; D.Flore, 'Les acteursd'unsysterne 
de justice penale europeen', in G. de Kerchove and A. Weyernbergh ( eds ), Vers un espace 
judiciaire penal europeen (Brussels 2000), p. 81; W. Bruggernan, 'Europol et Interpol', in 
G. de Kerchove and A. Weyembergh ( eds), op. cit., p. 9 7; S. Brammertz, 'Euro just. Parquet 
europeen de la prerniere generation', in G. de Kerchove and A. Weyembergh ( eds), op. cit., 
p.105. 
4 Not to mention the different police forces and varying competences in the Member States, 
see M. Anderson and J. Apap ( eds ), op. cit., p. 4 7. 
5 See H. Satzger .and F. Zimmermann, 'From Traditional Models of Judicial Assistance to 
the Principle of Mutual Recognition. New Developments of the Actual Paradigrn of the 
European Cooperation in Penal Matters', in M. Bassiouni, V. Militello and H. Satzger ( eds), 
European Cooperation in Penal Matters. Issues and Perspectives (Padova 2 008), p. 3 3 9. 
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Mutual legal assistance in criminal matters between the EU Member States 
takes place on the basis of the Mutual Assistance Convention of 2000 and its 
protocols. 6 Furthermore, the competent authorities cooperate through European 
agencies like Europol or Euro just. While the 2 000 Convention merely facilitates 
existing cooperation on the basis of the 1959 Council of Europe Convention 
on MutualAssistance in Criminal Matters and its 1978 Protocol, Europol and 
Eurojust add a new dimension: being central institutions, staff ed with liaisön 
agents from all Member States, they facilitate cooperation not only by means 
of data exchange, but through communication and problem shooting on an 
ad hoc basis. 
A prominent example of collaboration within the EU is the teamwork of 
national and European agents fighting fraud that affects EC financial interests. 
The work of the European Anti-Fraud Office, the so-called OLAF, adds a new 
characteristic feature to this cooperation. 7 
The Sehengen Agreement8 provides an example of institutionalised col-
laboration between EU Member States and non-Member States, namely Iceland, 
Norway9 and Switzerland10 (as well as Liechtenstein in the near future). 
Other forms of cooperation could be added, especially EU missions that talrn 
place in the framework of the Second Pillar, although the objective is one of 
law enforcement. 
3. Facts 
It is common knowledge that a gap exists between the theoretical and the practical 
approach towards police and judicial cooperation. My task during this conference 
is to present the theory- on paper. The approaches of practitioners will be part 
of workshops. However, the many points of intersection between theory and 
practice are important and should be included in further research. For example, 
6 EU Convention on Mutual Assistanee in Crim.inal Matters between the Mernber States of 
theEU of 29.5.2000, OfficialJournal, C 197, 12.7.2000, p. 1 (EU ConventiononMACM 
of 2000) and its Protoeol of 16.10.2001, OfficialJournal, C 326, 21.11.2001, p. 1. 
7 For further inforrnation see R. Tra~eä, 'La plaee de l'Offiee Europeen de Lutte Antifraude 
dans la repression de la fraude au budget eornmunautaire', Cahiers de droit europeen 
(2008), p. 7. 
8 Founded on Convention Implementing the Sehengen Agreement of 14 June 19 8 5 between 
the governments of the Benelux Eeonomie Union, the federal Republie of Germany and 
the Freneh Republie on the gradual abolition of eheeks at their eornmon borders of 19 
June 1990 (Sehengen Implementing Convention of 1990); for further information on 
the growing Sehengen acquis see e.g.: OfficialJournal, L 3 70, 17.12.2004, p. 78. 
9 See OfficialJournal, L 176, 10.7.1999, p. 36. 
10 See OfficialJournal, L 327, 5.12.2008, p. 15 with further referenees. 
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experience of the last decade in different areas has shown that EU solutions 
elaborated on paper usually find an informal outlet in practice anyway - one 
example being the operation of joint investigation teams.11 
3 .1. Feasible Ways to Organise Cooperation -Anything Goes? 
3 .1.1. Porms and Means of Police and Judicial Cooperation 
If one looks at forms and rneans of inter-State collaboration in the EU, there is 
cooperation of all sorts, which can be grouped together by common features 
such as:12 
traditional cooperation, such as requests for mutual assistance with regard 
to information or arrests;13 
cooperation relying on networking in a rather formal way, as in the 
European Judicial N etwork, or on an ad hoc basis such as the contact-point 
network set up to fight corruption;14 
'co-active cooperation', such as the establishment of joint investigation 
tearns15 or the organisation of joint controlled deliveries, 16 even on an 
11 See T. Schalken and M. Pronk, 'On Joint Investigation Teams', European Journal of Crime, 
Criminal Law and CriminalJustice (2002), p. 70. 
12 See J. Hecker, 'Europäisches Verwaltungskooperationsrecht am Beispiel der grenzüber-
schreitenden polizeilichen Zusanimenarbeit', EuR (2001), p. 8 2 6; J. Pierini and G. Pasqua, 
'Police Cooperation in the European Union. An Overview', in M. Bassiouni, V. Militello 
and H. Satzger (eds), op. cit., p. 407. 
13 E.g. Convention Relating to Extradition between the Member States of the EU of 27.9.1995, 
Official Journal, C 313, 23.10.1996, p. 11; Convention on Simplified Extradition Procedure 
between theMember States of theEU of 10.3.1995, OfficialJournal, C 78, 30.3.1995, p. 
2; Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of 
theEU of 29.5.2000, OfficialJournal, C 197, 12.7.2000, p. 1 (EU Convention onMACM 
of 2000) andProtocol of 16.10.2001, OfficialJournal, C 326, 21.11.2001, p. 1. 
14 Council Decision of 24 October 2008 on a Contact-point Network against Corruption, 
OfficialJournal, L 301, 12.11.2008, pp. 38-39. 
15 See J. Pierini and G. Pasqua, op. cit., p. 407 with further references. 
16 Regulations providing for the establishment of joint investigation teams: Art. 13 EU 
Convention on MACM of 2000; Council Framework Decision of 13.6.2002 on Joint 
Investigation Teams, OfficialJournal, L 162, 20.6.2002, p. l; Councilrecommendationof 
8. 5 .2 00 3 on a Model Agreement for Setting up a Joint Investigation Team (JIT), Official 
Journal, C 121, 23.5.2003, p. l; Regulations providingforjointcontrolleddeliveries: Art. 
12 EU Convention on MACM of 2000; Art. 73 Sehengen lnlplementing Convention of 
1990. 
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ad hoc basis in crisis situations;17 
transborder cooperation, such as cross-border hot pursuit or surveillance;18 
or cross-border data sharing, as outlined in the Council Decision of 2 3 
June 2008, due to the increase in cross-border cooperation, particularly 
in the combat against terrorism and cross-border crime;19 
the establishment of shared institutions, such as Europol, 20 or the establish-
ment of shared databases, e.g. the Sehengen Information System (SIS);21 
and, last but not least, 
collaboration based on the principle of mutual recognition, 22 which exists 
most prominently, at the moment, in the form of the European Arrest 
Warrant, 23 but has brought with it various new initiatives for reshaping 
cooperation within the EU. 24 
17 Council Decision of 23 June 2008 on the improvement of cooperation between the special 
intervention units of the Member States of the EU in crisis situations, Official Journal, L 
210, 6.8.2008, p. 73. 
18 Arts 40 and 41 Sehengen Implementing Convention of 19 90; M. Daman, op. cit., p. 179. 
19 OfficialJournal, L 210, 6.8.2008, p. 1. 
2 0 Council Act of 2 6 July 19 9 5 drawing up the Convention based on Art. K. 3 of the Treaty on 
European Union, on the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention) 
of 26 July 1995, OfjicialJournal, C 316, 27.11.1995 as weil as its protocols. 
21 Art. 9 2 Sehengen Implementing Convention of 19 9 0. 
22 See e.g. M. Hildebrandt, 'European Criminal Law and European Identity', Criminal Law 
andPhilosophy (2007), p. 73 et seq.; G. de Kerchove andA. Weyembergh (eds), La recon-
naissance mutuelle des decisions judicaires penales dans l 'Union europeenne (Brussels 2001); 
S. Peers, 'Mutual Recognition and Criminal Law in the European Union. Has the Council 
Got it Wrang?', Common Market Law Review (2004), p. 5. 
23 Council Framework Decision of 13.6.2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the 
Surrender Procedures between Member States - Statements made by certain Member 
States on the adoptionof theFrameworkDecision, OfficialJournal, L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 
1; Europol will become a European agency in 2010. 
24 See Council Framework Decision of 22.7.2003 on the Execution in the European Union 
of Orders Freezing Property or Evidence, Official Journal, L 196, 2. 8 .2 00 3, p. 4 5; Council 
Framework Decision of 24.2 .2 00 5 on the Application of the Principle of Mutual Recogni-
tion to Financial Penalties, OfficialJournal, L 76, 22.3.2005, p. 16; Council Framework 
Decision of 6.10.2006 on the Application of the Principle of Mutual Recognition to 
Confiscation Orders, Official Journal, L 328, 24.11.2006, p. 59; Council Framework 
Decisionof 18.12.2008 on theEuropeanEvidence WarrantforthePurposeof Obtaining 
Objects, Documents and Data for U sein Proceedings in Criminal Matters, Official Journal, L 
350, 30.12.08, p. 72; CouncilFrameworkDecision of 27.11.2008 on theApplication of 
the Principle of Mutual Recognition to Judgements and ProbationDecisions with a View 
to the Supervision of Probation Measures and Alternative Sanctions, Official Journal, L 
337, 16.12.08, p.102; CouncilFrameworkDecisionof 27.11.2008 on theApplication 
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3. 1.2. Level of Cooperation and Institution-Building 
Looking at the degree of formal cooperation and institution-buildlng, one can 
also distinguish various kinds of cooperation, as the following categories show: 
horizontal cooperation between the competent authorities of the EU Member 
States with little institution-building, e.g. the Sehengen Framework,25 
which is - except for the SIS26 - a rather 'grassroots' proj ect of cross-border 
cooperation; 
vertical cooperation between the competent authorities of the EU Member 
States and EC agencies with independent institutions, such as OLAF,27 
which coordinates the fight against fraud; 28 
'hybrid' vertical cooperation, e.g. the cooperation between the EU Member 
States and special EU agencies, such as Europol29 or Euro just, 30 which are 
run by the Member States, but are on the European level. 
3. 1.3. Legal Framework and Rule-Making Authority 
Also, looking at the legal frameworks ( and thus at the rule-malcing authorities) 
one can differentiate between:31 
international law in a traditional sense as adopted by anational legislator, 
especially the old conventions on mutual legal assistance or new police 
treaties; 32 
EC law as adopted by the EC institutions - e. g. all regulations concerning 
the fight against fraud affecting the financial interests of the EC, involving 
'on-the-spot controls'; 33 
of the Principle of Mutual Recognition to Judgernents in Crirninal Matters Irnposing 
Custodial Sentences or Measures Involving Deprivation of Liberty for the Purpose of 
their Enforcement in the European Union, OfficialJournal, L 32 7, 5.12.08, p. 27. 
2 5 See supra note 8. 
26 Seesupra3.l.l. 
27 See supra 2.2. 
28 For further inforrnation on the peculiarities of such cooperation see e.g. R. Tra~cä, op. 
cit., p. 7. 
29 See infra 3.2. 
30 See infra 3.2. 
31 For further inforrnation see e.g. E. Wagner, 'The Integration of Sehengen into the 
Frarnework of the European Union', Legal Issues of European Integration (19 9 8), p. 1. 
32 See infra 3.2. 
33 M. Anderson andJ. Apap (eds), op. cit., p. 61; D. Flore, op. cit., p. 85. 
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'EU law' as 'adopted by EU institutions' - such as the Council Decision 
that replaces the EU Convention and transforms Europol into a European 
Agency;34 
national laws as a foundation, including all laws on mutual assistance in 
criminal matters; and 
- ad hoc regulations laid down by local competent authorities - e.g. for 
decisions concerning the establishment of joint investigation teams. 
3.2. Some Trends-Different Kinds of Cooperation 
Considering all the things going on within the field of Justice and Horne Affairs, 
one would, at first sight, concede that 'anything goes': 
- from refined mutual. assistance in criminal matters, e. g. by means provided 
for by the EU Convention of 2 000 which includes coactive and cross-border 
elements, 
through the establishment of mixed national/European frameworks and 
hybrid institutions, such as Europol and Eurojust, 
to mutual. recognition, e.g. the European Arrest Warrant. 35 
When considering this spectrum, one misses a coherent European model for 
police and judicial cooperation that serves as an archetype and mould. Such 
a standard could not only help discuss and solve policy issues, but also serve 
as a starting point from which to develop rules and eventually a doctrine for 
cooperation within the EU. But even if a consistent pattern is missing, one can 
make out trends in European cross-border collaboration for :fighting crime. 
Basically, one can distinguish two radical ends of a spectrum, namely traditional 
and vertical cooperation. 
3. 2. l. Traditional. Cooperation: No Institution-B uilding - International. Law 
At one end of the spectrum, there is still traditional cooperation. But, as a rule, 
for the EU Member States traditional, cooperation (i.e. without modern 'coactive' 
or 'cross-border' elements) belongs in the past. 36 The international law governing 
it consists mainly of conventions drafted in the forum of the Council of Europe. 
These conventions serve as so-called 'mother conventions'. 37 But the creation of 
34 See supra note 23. 
35 H. Nilsson, 'From. Classical Judicial Cooperation to Mutual Recognition', International 
Review of Penal Law (2006), p. 5 7. 
36 See e.g. C. Fijnaut, op. cit., p. 281. 
3 7 See e.g. Arts 1 and 2 EU MACM. 
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the EU 'area of freedom, security andjustice' has outgrown their basic idea of 
mere mutual legal assistance from the day European judicial space came about38 
and was given a programme and concrete agenda in Tampere. 39 
3.2.2. Vertical Cooperation: EC Agencies-EC Law 
At the other end of the spectrum is vertical cooperation, which involves EC 
agencies, relying on EC law and following the principle of 'mutual recognition' 
without restriction, even in the area of law enforcement.40 A prominent example 
is the fight against fraud coordinated and implemented by OLAF on the grounds 
of regulations such as Regulation 2185/96 and Regulation 1073/99. 
3. 2. 3. Cooperation in Justice and Horne Affairs 
Between traditional police and judicial cooperation between States and vertical 
cooperation within the EU, including collaboration between national authorities 
and EC agencies, is a grey area of cooperation. The so-called 'Third Pillar' of the 
EU opened up this wide range of nearly limitless possibilities. 
Wherever we have a common framework, such as the Sehengen coopera-
tion, the choice of 'opting in' and 'opting out' of either of these commitments 
is possible for those who cannot (like Switzerland) or do not want to participate 
in the full range of possibilities. 
3 .3. Evaluation of the Facts 
In looking at these facts -the 'results' -we see a lot. But what we see is a mess, 
chaos rather than order. Hence a preliminary conclusion can be drawn from the 
preceding discussion: if anything is possible, many things are tried out. 
Even in academic ivory towers, however, we know, in the long run, that only 
some of the instruments developed for the EU framework are used successfully. 
And from experience we also know that if we do not get rid of useless instruments 
and finally agree on a coherent system, things get too complicated and the whole 
regime will not work. A legal system such as police and judicial cooperation 
38 See e.g. C. Fijnaut, op. cit., p. 284; N. Dorn and S. White, 'Beyond "Pillars" and "Pas-
serelle" Debates. The European Union's Emerging Crime Prevention Space', Legal Issues 
of Europeanlntegration (1997), pp. 79-93; H. Nilsson, op. cit., pp. 53-58; H. Satzger and 
F. Zimmermann, op. cit., p. 360. 
39 SeeM. AndersonandJ. Apap (eds), op. cit., p.11; W. Hetzer, 'NationalCriminalProsecu-
tion and European Tendering of Evidence', European Journal. of Crime, Criminal. Law and 
Criminal.Justice (2004), p. 166. 
40 See R. Tra§cä, op. cit., p. 19. 
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needs method, structure and coherence; it needs an underlying concept of 
coordination and objective.41 
For instance, one cannot have mutual assistance based on the traditional 
Conventions of 19 5 7 and 19 5 9 while establishing a European Public Prosecutor, 
because there will be cases with conflict between the relevant law, competences 
and jurisdictions. 
Also, one cannot maintain traditional principles of mutual assistance (as, 
for example, the principle of speciality) while collecting evidence for another 
State while running common data systems giving access to the information 
on the principle of mutual recognition, because there will be the question of 
admissibility of such information in a criminal procedure. 42 
4. Problems of Police and Judicial Cooperation 
These preliminary findings point to the problems of police and judicial cooperation 
faced today. Two problems appear tobe most urgent. 
4.1. Introducing an Efficient, Coherent and Fair System of Police and 
Judicial Cooperation 
The first problem we have seen is the variety and mix of instruments in police 
and judicial cooperation, a situation that not only leads to fragmentation and 
inefficiency, but above all takes law enforcement interests into account rather 
than those of the defendant or the individual. 
The challenge of the complex system - or rather systems- of cooperation43 in 
the EU is known and is also hinted at in the 'proposed solutions' of the High-Level 
Advisory Group on the Future of European Justice Policy, which points out that: 
'the development of legal instruments to facilitate and enhance judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters has ... been in the centre of legislative 
work of the European Union over the last years' .44 
41 M. Anderson andJ. Apap (eds), op. cit., pp. 22, 24. 
42 For further discussion of adrnissibility of evidence in European frameworks, see W. Hetzer, 
op. cit., pp.166-183, 172. 
43 The situation is partly a consequence of the flexibility approach in Justice and Horne 
Affairs, see, e.g., A. Moravcsik and K. NicolaYdis, 'Federal Ideals and Constitutional 
Realities in the Treaty of Amsterdam', Journal of CommonMarket Studies (1998), p. 31. 
44 S. Bitter, 'Cornrnent oii Dagrnara Kornobis-Rornanowska', German Law Journal (2005), 
pp. 1641-1647. 
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A sobering statement follows: 'while significant progress was achieved much 
remains tobe done.' 45 Thereafter it points succinctly to mutual recognition as a 
policy. But, in considering the present situation, the Group asserts that European 
cooperation will only be successful if the law enforcement authorities use all 
existing instruments. In practice, however, local law enforcement authorities are 
often asked to choose from among the various legal instruments in individual 
cases. This task leads to inefficacy, because the police and judiciary acting on 
the spot might refrain from participating in international teamwork. 
Mutual recognition, in any case, is not the only solution proposed. Another 
strategy could be the reorganisation and redefinition of the European and national 
law enforcement institutions and their cooperation.46 
The third difficulty mentioned, the protection of the defendant' s rights in the 
framework of the fight against cross-border crime, has been a topic for much 
discussion, since the problem affects all forms of cooperation.47 lt is also dealt 
with by the High-Level Advisory Group, which states in its June 2008 Report: 
'Ensuring a high degree of protection for their rights in criminal 
investigations and proceedings throughout Europe, whether they are 
involved as victims or suspects or witnesses ... Securing citizens' rights 
is the foundation of our basic orders under the rule of law - both at the 
national and European level. As such, it is apparent in practically all life 
situations, but particularly in the area of state interference - for example 
in criminal investigation proceedings - and in the area of establishing 
judicial procedures to assert private-law claims, as well as to ensure 
protection of fundamental rights by the courts.'48 
Although several initiatives were launched and worked on in order to establish 
procedural safeguards49 and minimum rights in criminal proceedings through-
45 High-Level Advisory Group, Report of June 2008, op. cit., p. ill.3.1. 
46 An example of such an initiative is the Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament on the role of Eurojust and the European Judicial 
N etwork in the fight against crime and terrorism in the EU, COM (2 00 7) 644 final, which 
strengthens the position of Eurojust's powers as a European institution. 
47 S. Gless, 'Mutual Recognition, Judicial Inquiries, Due Process and Fundamental Rights', 
in J. Vervaele ( ed. ), European Evidence Warrant. TransnationaI JudiciaI Inquiries in the EU 
(Antwerp 2005), p. 121; A. Smeulers, 'The Position on the Individual in International 
Criminal Cooperation', inJ. Vervaele (ed.), op. cit., p. 79. 
48 High-LevelAdvisory Group, Report of June 2008, op. cit., p. ill.3.1.1. 
49 C. Brants, 'Procedural Safeguards in the European Union. Too Llttle, Too Late?', in J. 
Vervaele (ed.), op. cit., p. 103; T. Rafaraci, op. cit., p. 363. 
35 
The Future of Police and Judicial Cooperation in the European Union 
out Europe, they all ultimately failed. The High-Level Advisory Group Report, 
nevertheless, is of the opinion that: 50 
'The consistent past decisions of the European Court of Justice have 
tecognised an obligation on the part of the Community to respect 
fundamental rights as they are guaranteed in the European Convention 
of Human Rights and as general principles of Community law derived 
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. Based 
upon that formulation, which can be found in Article 6 (2) of the EU 
Treaty, the Court of Justice, in its judicial decisions, has developed these 
fundamental rights as general legal principles.' 51 
In enacting EU law, Member States also bear in mind the need to protect the 
fundamental rights of the individual - even if this might be just paying lip 
service. 52 However, in the framework of the European Union little specific hard 
law has been enacted that efficiently protects individuals' rights affected by the 
fight against cross-border crime. Unfortunately the set-up of such 'human rights 
of European citizens' with regard to this particular area has so far failed. 53 
4.2. Establishing Accountability 
The second problem that I would like to address briefly ( which is not dealt with by 
the High-Level Advisory Group) is the problem of accountability. Accountability 
of cross-border police and judicial cooperation has been a constant topic for 
discussion since the EU established such forms of collaboration. 54 
Let us consider two kinds of accountability: 
democratic accountability for legislation which shapes cooperation; and 
- judicial accountability for certain acts within a cooperation. 
50 Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Certain Procedural Rights in Criminal 
Proceedings throughout theEuropean Union [COM (2004) 328 final]; R. Lööf, 'Shooting 
from the Hip. Proposed Minimum Rights in Criminal Proceedings throughout the EU', 
EuropeanLaw Journal (2006), p. 421. 
51 High-LevelAdvisory Group, Report of June 2008, op. cit., p. III.3.1.2. 
52 See e.g. Council Decision of 23.6.2008 on the Step-up of Cross-border cooperation, 
particularly in Combating Terrorism and Cross-border Crime, Official Journal, 210, 
6.8.2008, pp. 12-72. 
53 M. Hildebrandt, op. cit., p. 75. 
54 See M. Anderson andJ. Apap (eds), op. cit., p. 13; M. den Boer, op. cit., pp. 275-289; D. 
Flore, op. cit., p. 85. 
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4.2.1. Democratic Accountability 
Legislation on police and judicial cooperation has so far been divided, roughly, 55 
between: 
national lawmakers (for horizontal police or judicial cooperation); 
European lawmakers (for vertical police or judicial cooperation; and 
a rnixture of European and nationallegislators (for the 'hybrid institutions' 
of the Third Pillar, such as Europol and Eurojust)-national and European 
agents, who have held each other responsible for the flaws in the system. 
To comply with the rule of law, i.e. to create a legitimate legal system, each 
lawmaker must not only have the competence to create56 and implement rules, 
but must establish a system of democratic accountability. 57 In an area where, 
from the beginning, the lawmaker - in this case the European Union - suffered 
from a wealdegitimacy profile in the public 's opinion, it is especially important to 
handle this requirement with care. Therefore the competent authorities should 
set up a strong regime of democratic accountability and guarantee transparency 
in the decision-maldng process. 
Although the problem of democratic accountability at the European level, 
especially within the structure of the Third Pillar, is well lmown and has been 
widely criticised for a long time, previous treaties have tackled the problem with 
caution. 58 The Lisbon Treaty is now trying to remove the democratic shortcom-
ings, for example by asldng for more involvement by the European parliament 
in the legislative process. In general, there is also a trend towards a more formal 
involvement by national parliaments, which could help to build the public's trust 
and ensure transparency and a lively exchange of views on European criminal 
justice policy at the national level. 
However, as long as there are no clear-cut competences and explicit power 
divisions between national and European legislators and policy-makers, democratic 
accountability will remain a problem. 
55 See also M. Anderson andJ. Apap (eds), op. cit., p. 42. 
5 6 A critical approach with regard to 'European criminal law' is presented by P.-A. Albrecht 
and S. Braum, 'Deficiencies in the Development of European Criminal Law', European Law 
Journal (1999), p. 293. 
5 7 On the whole, national bodies have often not lived up to their commitments in Justice 
and Horne Affairs and failed to implement relevant European law. 
58 M. Anderson andJ. Apap (eds), op. cit., p. 8; E. Spaventa, 'OpeningPandora'sBox. Some 
Reflections on the Constitutional Effects of the Decision in Pupino', European Constitutional 
Law Review (2007), p. 6; A. Whelan, 'Fundamental Rights. Democracy and The Rule of 
Law in the Pillar', in G. Barrett (ed.), Justice Cooperation in the European Union (Dublin 
1997), p. 207. 
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4.2.2. Judicial Accountability 
The lack of judicial accountability, i.e. the deficiency in jurisdictions for the 
accountability of courts and for judicial review, is not so rnuch a problern for 
horizontal cooperation -where, as a general rule, national courts have jurisdic-
tion - nor is it a problern for purely vertical cooperation - where the European 
Court of Justice exercises judicial control in general. The territorial State is liable 
for infringernents of law by their own agents and by foreign agents unless the 
foreign officials act ultra vires or a contractual shift of responsibilities exists. lt is 
rather that the hybrid institutions of the Third Pillar face problerns, since they are 
neither part of the national nor fit into the EU judicial frarneworks. 59 According 
to Art. 3 5 TED, the European Court of Justice has very lirnited jurisdiction with 
regard to this hybrid area. 60 
The High-Level Advisory Group realises that the protection of rights through 
the European Court of Justice is problernatic.61 Although it points out, on the 
one hand, that the Court has helped to further the cause of judicial review in 
the area of fundamental rights in the existing frarnework so far, it does not, on 
the other hand, present any solutions to the problern of inadequate jurisdiction 
and control rnechanisms. 62 
Although this deficiency of the EU Justice and Horne Affairs frarnework has 
been widely criticised, 63 the Member States only reluctantly put forward a solution 
for judicial review in the Lisbon Treaty. 64 Since the Lisbon Treaty changes the 
overall frarnework for the protection of individual' s rights however, the chances 
of a new era with regard to these rights are quite prornising. However, the June 
2008 Report by the High-Level Advisory Group envisions: 65 
'With the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union' s Charter of Fundamental 
Rights is to becorne binding law. With this, the fundamental rights 
proclaimed in the Charter will be binding not only for the bodies of the 
European Union and of Member States when implernenting Community 
law; they will also be applied and interpreted by the Court of Justice. 
59 See e.g. S. Gless, 'Rechtsvergleichender Querschnitt undrechtspolitischeBemerkungen', 
in S. Gless, R. Grate and G. Heine (eds), Justitielle Einbindung und Kontrolle von Europol 
(Freiburg inlBreisgau 2001), vol. 1, p. 677; H. Satzger and F. Zinlmermann, op. cit., p. 
425. 
60 E. Spaventa, op cit., p. 8. 
61 High-Level Advisory Group, Report of June 2008, op. cit., p. Ill.1.1.1. 
62 See High-Level Advisory Group, Report of June 2008, op. cit., p. Ill.1.1.2. 
63 S. Gless, op. cit., p. 680; J. Monar, 'Justice and Horne Affairs in the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
Reform and the Price of Fragmentation', EuropeanLaw Review (1998), pp. 330-333. 
64 See supra 4.2 .2. 
65 See High-Level Advisory Group, Report of June 2008, op. cit., p. Ill.1.1.2. 
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This will contribute to an intensification of the European protection of 
fundamental rights. As such, with respect to the uniform area of freedom, 
security and justice, the Court of Justice rnight address issues involving 
fundamental rights both more often and more rapidly.' 
In fact, the Lisbon Treaty would also provide the basis for further action in the 
field of minimum standards in the law of crirninal procedure. The aim is not 
the harmonisation of national crirninal procedural rights - at least not in an 
'all the same' approach. Rather, harmonisation is understood as 'a process in 
which diverse elements are combined or adapted to each other so as to form a 
coherent whole while retaining their individuality'. 66 The High-Level Advisory 
Group's goal67 should be to provide all citizens of the European Union with a 
basic minimum set of rights should they come under scrutiny in a criminal 
investigation. Thus it suggests including at least the rights discussed for the 
proposal for a Framework Decision to strengthen the rights of the accused in 
crirninal proceedings, 68 and addressing additional measures. Such measures 
could, for example, include the introduction of minimum rules considering the 
presumption of innocence. 
5. Prospects for Reorganisation of Police and Juclicial 
Cooperation 
We now look at the prospects for police and judicial cooperation after the Treaty of 
Lisbon has entered into force. Will this restructured and consolidated cooperation 
work for the future? What will future cooperation look like? 
5 .1. Is Reorganisation Feasible under the Lisbon Treaty 
Reorganisation of police and judicial cooperation as such is not considered in 
the Lisbon Treaty. 
5.1.1. Judicial Cooperation 
The Lisbon Treaty addresses topics of judicial cooperation. Basically, in its Art. 
82, it links judicial cooperation between EU Member States to the concept of 
mutual recognition. This assignment offers the chance for a solid rearrangement 
6 6 M. Boodman, 'The Myth of Harmonization of Laws', American Journal of Comparative Law 
(1991), p. 700. 
67 See High-Level Advisory Group, Report of June 2008, op. cit., p. III.1.1.3. 
6 8 E.g. right to information with regard to procedural rights; right to defence counsel; right 
to an interpreter and to a translation of the relevant procedural documents. 
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of such cooperation. In the future, the collaboration of judicial authorities 
would, in contrast to police cooperation, thus follow one model only: the judicial 
authorities of the Member States would accredit judicial decisions taken by 
their colleagues in other Member States in a lean procedure which builds on 
cross-border trust among the judiciary. 
All the adopted measures for judicial cooperation based on the concept of 
mutual recognition are drafted in a similar way, with small variations due to 
the nature of the various aspects ( arrest, seizure, financial penalties, freezing 
property, probation decisions, etc.). 69 
However, the Lisbon Treaty approach is rather cautious when it comes to 
various delicate issues. For example, it does not tackle the challenge of judicial 
review or of implementing compulsory minimum standards which ensure a fair 
trial and an effective evaluation system to monitor it. 
The Lisbon Treaty brings about a more radical change in terms of possible 
reform of the cooperation between EU Member States' authorities and a potential 
European prosecution agency: Art. 86 Lisbon Treaty not only commits such 
judicial cooperation to the principle of mutual recognition, but, furthermore, 
opens up the prospect with regard to the establishment of a central European law 
enforcement agency, i.e. a European Public Prosecutor. In doing so, the Treaty 
talrns into consideration many years of discussion, primarily triggered by the 
'Corpus Juris' study70 related to the combating fraud affecting the Community 
budget. 
However, the Lisbon Treaty again addresses the topic in a cautious way: The 
establishment of a European Public Prosecutor is - in the worst-case scenario of 
Art. 8 6 Lisbon Treaty- subject to enhanced cooperation, and tricky questions 
are as yet unanswered. The Lisbon Treaty does not, for example, provide an 
indication as to how this institution should be connected to national law enforce-
ment or European cooperation. Neither does it determine a clear-cut division of 
tasks or competences for such a European Public Prosecutor. If, in the future, 
the Member States - or even just some of them ( since the European Prosecutor 
is open to enhanced cooperation) -were to really designate a European Public 
Prosecutor according to Art. 8 6 Lisbon Treaty, judicial cooperation would have 
to be reorganised accordingly. 
5.1.2. Police Cooperation 
As already indicated the Lisbon Treaty sketches its vision of police cooperation only 
very roughly in Arts 8 7 -8 9 - though without offering much further guidance. 
69 For information on specific measures, see note 24. 
70 M. Delmas-Marty and J. Vervaele ( eds), The Implementation of the Corpus Juris in the Member 
States (Antwerp 2000), 4 vol. 
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5.1.3. Conclusion 
Reorganisation of police cooperation is thus not possible under the Lisbon Treaty. 
Also, reorganisation of judicial cooperation would have to follow the principle 
of mutual recognition. 
5.2. Solving the Problem of Accountability 
Does the Lisbon Treaty solve the second problem mentioned above, the problem 
of accountability? 
5. 2 .1. Democratic Accountability 
The Lisbon Treaty introduces a common 'ordinary' legislative procedure as a 
general rule, which applies to the area of cross-border law enforcement and 
cooperation in criminal matters. 
However, there are some (important) deviations from the general rule in 
law-adopting requirements that cannot be explored in detail here. But it is 
important to note that: 
( a) as a last resort, Member States can still claim 'fundamental aspects of 
their criminal justice systems'; and 
(b) enhanced cooperation is an option for those who want to move on by leaving 
behind the reluctant; this creates different European legal frameworks. 
For the salce of transparency and accountability of judicial and police cooperation 
it would be preferable to introduce this 'ordinary' legislative procedure for all 
areas. However, one has to accept that in the Member States all operational fields 
that work according to the unanimity rule are highly sensitive with regard to 
what could be described as 'national identity'. They fear a lass of competences 
that are crucial to their essential functions. 
5.2.2. Judicial Accountability 
Surprisingly, there is no specific reference in Title IV of the Lisbon Treaty to the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice over Justice and Horne Affairs matters as 
such. Thus regular jurisdiction - according to Art. 256 Lisbon Treaty- must 
be applied. However, Art. 2 7 6 reads as follows: 
'In exercising its powers regarding the provisions of Chapters 4 and 5 of 
Title V of Part Three relating to the area of freedom, security and justice, 
the Court of Justice of the European Union shall have no jurisdiction 
to review the validity or proportionality of operations carried out by 
the police or other law-enforcement services of a Member State or the 
exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with 
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regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of 
internal security.' 
lt is not clear whether this modification is meant tobe a broad curtailment, and 
thus is true also for the operations of judicial cooperation. At this moment nobody, 
therefore, knows whether this limitation will come to hold back judicial review. 
Furthermore, it is not clear yet, what the options of countries like the UK, Ireland 
and Denmark are. In order to avoid the Court' s jurisdiction over a particular 
act, these countries simply want to opt out of judicial review in certain ways. 
However, as mentioned above, the Lisbon Treaty also provides a basis for 
action in the field of criminal procedure. Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty will 
strengthen the relationship with the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Thus the European Court of Justice may also decide on the application and inter-
pretation of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights with regard to police 
and judicial cooperation. Since this is possible within the scope of preliminary 
decision proceedings, a new era of judicial review could begin. 
6. Summary 
After this analysis of the facts and problems of police and judicial cooperation, 
the concluding question must be: what malrns police or judicial cooperation 
work at all? Or conversely: when and why does it not work? 
6.I. The Classic Answer 
In traditional settings the question was: why do sovereign states assist each 
other in law enforcement? Why do they malm other people' s problerns their own. 
The classic answer was: 'Do ut des .. .', i.e. 'tit for tat .. .'. This principle is easy to 
understand and is still at work outside the European Union's area of freedom, 
justice and security, and sometirnes even inside it as well -reciprocity is always 
a requirement for mutual legal assistance in crirninal matters. 
6.2. Principle of Solidarity · 
Regarding police and judicial cooperation between EU Member States, several 
legal acts and institutions evoke a new spirit, or rather introduce a new legal 
doctrine to promote cross-border teamwork and replace the old thinking of 'col-
laboration among and along the lines of sovereign states'. 71 This new approach 
builds on the principle of solidarity. 
71 J. Vogel, 'The European Integrated Criminal Justice System and its Constitutional 
Framework', Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2005), p. 131. 
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6.2.1. Pupino Reasoning- Principle of Solidarity 
Prominent in such new reasoning is the famous Pupino decision. lt-controver-
sially- extended supranational principles, such as the concepts of effectiveness 
and loyalty based on Art. 10 TEC, to the classic Third Pillar domain. The details 
are disputed, but looking at the core of the matter, the Court' s judgement mainly 
emphasises the importance of the loyalty principle within the European Union 
as a whole. 
Although it was not a case directly connected with police or judicial coopera-
tion, this judgement by the ECJ also aclmowledges a principle of solidarity, which 
includes the duty to cooperate loyally. 72 The Court basically held that it would 
be very difficult for the Union to carry out its duties if the principle of loyal 
cooperation were not also binding in the Third Pillar. The principle of loyalty is 
enshrined in Art. 10 TEC for EC law purposes, and requires that Member States 
take all measures necessary to ensure the fulfilment of their obligations under 
European law. The Court deduces that the principle of loyalty also applies to 
cross-border collaboration in Justice and Horne Affairs and thus creates the 
principle of loyal cooperation. With the Pupino judgement, the Court of Justice 
has built a bridge, extending First Pillar principles to the Third Pillar. 73 
lt is still, however, to be determined in detail (perhaps during discussions in 
workshops) whether and if so how this setting of EC law can be transferred to 
Justice and Horne Affairs and its cooperation in various areas of law enforce-
ment. The problems are apparent in all forms of cooperation, most clearly in 
connection with the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) and its abolition of dual 
criminality- and when it eventually comes to the approximation of laws. 74 
In practice - this much we also know in the ivory towers of Europe - mutual 
recognition (in all fields) only works where mutual trust exists. And for one 
reason or another, there appears to be less mutual trust in criminal matters 
than in civil proceedings. 
6.2.2. Solidarity- in the Face of a Policy of Mutual Recognition 
Some time has passed since the Pupino decision. The Europeari institutions 
have not elaborated a specific principle of solidarity as a model for European 
police and judicial cooperation. A discussion about the implications of a duty 
72 S. Bitter, op. cit.; E. Spaventa, op. cit., p. 22. 
73 E. Herlin-Karnell, 'In the Wake of Pupino. Advocaten voor der Wereld and Dell'Orto', 
GermanLaw Journal (2007), pp. 1147-1160. 
7 4 For further information see A. Weyembergh, 'Approximation of Criminal Laws, the 
Constitutional Treaty and the Hague Programme', Common Market Law Review (2 00 5), 
p. 1567; A. Klip, Criminal Law tn the European Union (Inaugural lecture Maastricht 
University, 2004), p. 61. 
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to cooperate loyally and about the obligations resulting from a principle of 
solidarity would have been helpful for defining ideas for future European police 
and judicial cooperation. lt is more and more apparent that solidarity regarding 
cooperation in cross-border law enforcement is intrinsically tied to other issues 
concerned with the formation of a genuine European Union, namely building 
mutual trust. 75 This is all the more true, since, as of late, cooperation within the 
EU in the domain of law enforcement has developed further towards a policy 
of mutual recognition. 
The dedication to this particular instrument, its philosophy as weil as its 
implications are clearly spelled out by Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer 
in Advocaten voor de Wereld: 
'the situation is no longer one where sovereign States cooperate in individual 
cases; instead it is one where Member States of the European Union are 
required to assist one another when offences which it is in the common 
interest to prosecute have been perpetrated' (C-303/05, No. 46). 
Were this statement true, judicial cooperation at least would have outgrown a 
situation where 'anything goes, but nothing works'. Member States would be 
bound by an instruction or rather a doctrine which would oblige them to (re-) 
organise police and judicial cooperation in a way that advances and fosters 
legitimate common interests to prosecute in cross-border criminal cases. Such 
a duty would include a true commitment to adopt and implement a colierent 
policy for a European criminal justice system, spelled out in a pattern for police 
and judicial cooperation, which can in practice balance law enforcement interests 
and guarantee fair trials, while at the same time build trust through transparency 
and accountability. Given such ideals, Member States still have some way to go 
until the spirit of Pupino and Advocaten voor de Wereld prevails in the work of 
police and judicial cooperation. 
The High-Level Advisory Group points to the problem stating: 
'In the meantime, it has become clear that the mere application of 
the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions or those of 
investigative authorities is not sufficient to create a true area of freedom, 
security and justice.'76 
In fact, it needs mutual trust - and veritable solidarity. In their analysis of 
Sovereignty and Solidarity: US and EU, being part of a study on Governing Work 
and Welfare in a New Economy, J osua Cohen and Charles F. Sabel illustrate that 
7 5 M. Anderson and J. Apap ( eds), op. cit. note 2, p. 17. 
76 High-Level Advisory Group, Report of June 2008, op. cit., p. III.1.1.1. 
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sovereignty - as legitimate political authorship - always rests on solidarity. 77 
In their view, solidarity is neither solely a sentiment of identity, nor simply 
complementarity rooted in the division of labour: 
'Rather it is both moral and practical. Moral, in that individuals recognize 
one another as moral agents entitled to be treated as equals; practical, 
in that they are bound to each other by the recognition that each is 
better able to learn what he or she needs to master problems through 
collaboration with the others whose experiences, orientations and even 
most general goals differ from his or her own - a recognition that both 
expresses and reinforces a sense of human commonality that extends 
beyond existing solidarities. Such practical attachment is fostered by a 
pervasively uncertain world, where even the strongest have reason to 
favor a division of investigative labor to incurring the risks of choosing 
and executing a solution alone. In such a world the practical benefits 
that flow from constant testing and reexamination of assumptions and 
practices that defines a public provides a powerful motive to participate 
in collaborative problem solving on equal terms.' 78 
If such solidarity were to animate police and judicial cooperation in the European 
Union, it might eventually enable the Union to establish sovereignty in cross-
border law enforcement. · 
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